Theorems of arithmetic are used, perhaps essentially, to reach conclusions about the natural world. This applicability can be explained in a natural way by analogy with the applicability of statements of law to the world. ;In order to carry out an ontological argument for my thesis, I assume the existence of universals as a working hypothesis. I motivate a theory of laws according to which statements of law are singular statements about scientific properties. Such statements entail generalizations about instances of (...) those properties. My task, then, is to show that theorems of arithmetic, in application, are similar to statements of law in this respect. On the basis of my working hypothesis, I argue that there are inclining reasons to think that cardinal numbers are scientific properties whose instances occur in the natural world. The works of Mill, Frege and Benacerraf play central roles in these arguments. ;In general, I urge that there are no conclusive epistemological or ontological factors which preclude arithmetical truths from being laws of nature. Consequently, I think we can extend any semantic theory which is adequate for statements of law to theorems of arithmetic. This would apply even to a theory of predication which does not involve commitment to universals. So, to the degree that my argument succeeds with the working hypothesis, it also supports the unconditioned thesis that arithmetical truths are laws of nature. (shrink)

At the turn of the century, Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl both participated in the discussion concerning the foundations of logic and mathematics. Since the 1960s, comparisons have been made between Frege's semantic views and Husserl's theory of intentional acts. In quite recent years, new approaches to the two philosophers' views have appeared. This collection of articles opens with the first English translation of Dagfinn Føllesdal's early classic on Husserl and Frege of 1958. The book brings together (...) a number of new contributions by well-known authors and gives a survey of recent developments in the field. It shows that Husserl's thought is coming to occupy a central role in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, as well as in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The work is primarily meant for philosophers, especially for those working on the problems of language, logic, mathematics, and mind. It can also be used as a textbook in advanced courses in philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology by Robert B. BrandomJacob L. GoodsonA Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology. By Robert B. Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. 856 pp. $50.00 hardcover.What a feat: an interpretation of G. F. W. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit that is longer than the Phenomenology of Spirit itself! With 757 pages of text, and reportedly a work that (...) took Robert B. Brandom over 40 years to write, A Spirit of Trust accomplishes much and offers an interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology that mixes epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of mind.Hegel scholars will be discontent with Brandom’s heavily analytic interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology. Analytic philosophers will be discontent with attributing to Hegel arguments and insights often attributed to Frege (this happens so often one reviewer says of Brandom’s book that he should call Hegel Fregel—a mix of Frege and Hegel). Scholars of American Philosophy might be the most excited by reading Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust because he goes out of his way to put Hegel in conversation with Donald Davidson, W. V. O. Quine, Wilfred Sellars, and others who are part of the American philosophical tradition.Such excitement, however, might eventually be tempered when one realizes that Brandom is no defender of philosophical naturalism in A Spirit of Trust. Indeed, waiting until page 499, Brandom claims that the remainder of the book (another 250 pages) involves telling the story of how Hegel connects alienation with reductive naturalism. Brandom’s story involves developing a “nonreductive account of how we should understand the place of norms in the natural world” (499). Once we understand norms in a way that avoids or eschews naturalism, then we overcome the problem of alienation. Whereas Karl Marx blames alienation on capitalism, Brandom blames alienation on naturalism.In addition to the adjective “reductive,” Brandom offers three other adjectives for naturalism: “disenchanted” (see 263), “normative” (see 558), and “scientific” [End Page 97] (see 661–65). According to Brandom, the dominance of scientific naturalism is one of the reasons his interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology is required right now. Brandom thinks scientific naturalism has a stronghold on contemporary philosophy, and Hegel’s Phenomenology offers a corrective to this mistake in contemporary philosophy. Let us take each of these naturalisms in turn.1. Disenchanted Naturalism. Situating Hegel’s Phenomenology in relation to the problems Hegel wanted to address in his own day, Brandom claims: “Another strand of the early modern tradition that Hegel takes up and develops is the disenchanting naturalism about norms”—which is “most evident in the British sentimentalists... who give explanatory pride of place to practical attitudes of normative assessment, of reflective approval or disapproval by a distinctive moral faculty, which they see as... rooted in a characteristic sentiment, typically... benevolence” (263). Brandom admits that Kant also repairs the tradition of British sentimentalism, but one of the themes of Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust involves how Kant’s emphasis on autonomy itself gets repaired by Hegel’s focus on recognition. Hence Kant’s repair of disenchanted naturalism remains necessary but insufficient. On Brandom’s interpretation, Hegel’s theory of recognition properly repairs both disenchanted naturalism and Kant’s theory of autonomy.2. Normative Naturalism. Staying with Hegel’s repair of Kant’s philosophy, Brandom finds a version of naturalism in Kant’s thinking as well. This version is normative naturalism, which attempts to “integrate reasons and causes” (558). Brandom claims, “This project, broadly construed, is to provide a response to Kant’s Third Antimony—the challenge to integrate reasons and causes. A significant proportion of Hegel’s claim... should be seen as deriving from his response to this issue of normative naturalism. So the stakes are very high” (558). Brandom’s rhetoric here reflects one of the annoyances of the book: every problem driving Hegel’s Phenomenology is the most important problem driving Hegel’s Phenomenology. The stakes are always high, and Brandom does not signal to the reader any way to rank the problems Hegel addresses in Phenomenology.According to Brandom, Hegel repairs Kant’s normative naturalism by separating reasons... (shrink)

Pace Perry, wondering whether perceived things are identical is thinking about them, for Hume, with no thought of perceptions of them. Hume is not a proto-Fregean; Hume's Difficulty is not a version of Frege's Puzzle. Pace Falkenstein, wondering about an identity is not wondering whether clearly distinct things--stages, surfaces, names--are connected in some way. Pace Garrett, wondering about the identity of an observed object is wondering whether it is really one or two things, not whether there is one F (...) or two Fs. Second, Humean consciousness is apperception, not immediate awareness. Third, Hume finds nothing with epistemic merit. (shrink)

Why did Hume drop sympathy as a key concept of his moral philosophy, and why—on the other hand—did Smith make it into the ‘didactic principle’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments? These questions confront us with the basic issue of ethical theory concerning human nature. My point in dealing with these questions is to show what views of human nature their respective choices involved. And my procedure will be to take a close look at the revisions they made to their (...) ethical theories to bring out the contrasting aspects of their views of human nature. (shrink)

There is a Mexican, as well as a Canadian version of the American Dream. What drives political idealism in Mexico is less the idea of individual right, or respect for the rights of communities, than it is the 'indigenous' right of an historically oppressed people to a political culture and life wholly their own.